State v. Gonzalez Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42883 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-30-2015
State v. Gonzalez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42883
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Gonzalez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42883" (2015). Not Reported. 2168.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2168
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 











BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
COPY 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
TED S. TOLLEFSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P. 0. Box 83720 




BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate 
Public Defender 
P. 0. Box 2816 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
DEC 3 0 2015 
Supreme ourt.........; ourt o pea 
Entered on ATS by_ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ............................................................................... ,, .... 1 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ........................................ 1 
ISSUES ................................................................................................................. 8 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 9 
I. Gonzalez Has Failed To Show The District Court 
Erred When It Denied His Motion For A Mistrial .............................. 9 
A. Introduction ........................................................................... 9 
B. Standard Of Review .............................................................. 9 
C. Gonzalez Has Failed To Show The District 
Court Erred When It Denied His Motion For 
A Mistrial .............................................................................. 10 
II. Gonzalez Has Failed To Show The District Court 
Committed Fundamental Error When It Did Not 
Remove A Competency Evaluation From The PSI ....................... 16 
A. Introduction ......................................................................... 16 
B. Gonzalez Did Not Object To The District 
Court Leaving The 2006 Competency 
Evaluation In The PSI Materials And 
He Has Failed To Establish Fundamental 
Error On Appeal. ................................................................. 16 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) ......................................................... 11 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) .................................................. 10, 15 
State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 297 P.3d 257 (Ct. App. 2013) ......... 10, 15 
State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 894 P.2d 125 (1995) ..................................... 18 
State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 965 P.2d 174 (1998) ......................................... 19 
State v. Passons, 158 Idaho 286, 346 P.3d 303 (Ct. App. 2015) ................... 9, 10 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010) .............................. 10, 15, 18 
State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 665 P.2d 1102 (Ct. App. 1983) ................. 10, 11 
RULES 
I.C.R. 29.1 (a) ...................................................................................................... 10 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Antonio Cuellar Gonzalez appeals from the judgment of the district court, 
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of aggravated battery and use of 
a deadly weapon in commission of crime, and his guilty plea to a persistent 
violator enhancement. 
On appeal, Gonzalez argues the district court erred when it denied his 
motion for mistrial. Gonzalez also argues the district court abused its discretion 
when it did not order a prior competency evaluation be removed from the 
historical PSI materials. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mary Hone saw a man, later identified as Frankie Steel, riding a bicycle 
down the middle of an alleyway, near the Corpus Christi house in Boise. 
(10/21/14 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 9-13, p. 32, L. 16 - p. 33, L. 10, p. 102, Ls. 10-12.) As 
Mr. Steel was turning his bicycle around, Gonzalez hit Mr. Steel with a stick. 
(10/21/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 17 - p. 28, L. 19, p. 32, L. 16 - p. 35, L. 12.) The stick 
was about three feet long. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 35, L. 6 - p. 36, L. 5.) Gonzalez hit 
Mr. Steel so hard that it sounded like a gunshot. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 1-5.) 
Gonzalez's first strike caused Mr. Steel to start to fall off his bicycle. (10/21/14 
Tr., p. 34, Ls. 6-16.) Gonzalez struck Mr. Steel two more times, causing Mr. 
Steel to fall to the ground. (Id.) Gonzalez then fled the scene. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 
36, Ls. 17-23.) 
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Ms. Hone called 911 and gave aid Mr. Steel. (10/21/14 37, 24 
- p. 38, 13; Ex. 29.) Mr. Steel had blood covering his face and shoulders and 
his white T-shirt was mostly covered in blood. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 42, L. 22 - p. 43, 
L. 5.) 
Before Gonzalez attacked Mr. Steel, Mr. Steel had his hands on the 
handlebars of the bicycle. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 12-22.) Mr. Steel was not 
holding anything else in his hands. (Id.) Mr. Steel did not say anything to 
Gonzalez before Gonzalez attacked him. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 3-13.) 
Dan Ault, one of the managers of the Interfaith Sanctuary, followed 
Gonzalez when he fled the scene. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 14-25.) While Mr. 
Ault was following Gonzalez, Mr. Ault also called 911. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 100, Ls. 
4-6.) Mr. Ault followed Gonzalez and pointed Gonzalez out to the police. 
(10/21/14 Tr., p. 100, L. 7 - p. 101, L. 7.) 
Officer Anderson made contact with Gonzalez and asked him about the 
fight. (Ex. 30 at 0:36-1:50; see also 10/21/14 Tr., p. 137, L. 5-p. 141, L. 15.) 
Gonzalez repeatedly denied knowing anything about a fight. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 
137, Ls. 12-19.) After Officer Anderson informed Gonzalez that he had been 
followed from the scene of the fight by a witness, Gonzalez requested an 
attorney. (See PSI, p. 60.) 
The state charged Gonzalez with aggravated battery and use of a deadly 
weapon in the commission of a crime. (R., pp. 42-43, 86-87.) The state also 
filed a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 60-63.) 
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At trial, Ms. Hone testified (10/21/14 , p. 19, 17 - p. 91, L. 14.) In 
addition to testifying that she saw Gonzalez repeatedly hit Mr. Steel with a stick, 
she also testified that when the police arrived she showed them the stick. 
(10/21/14 Tr., p. 47, L. 8 - p. 48, L. 8; Ex. 5.) The state introduced a recording of 
Ms. Hone's 911 call. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 41, L. 3-p. 42, L. 11; Ex. 29.) 
Mr. Ault testified that he saw two men fighting and heard something that 
"sounded just like a baseball bat, just like when a baseball bat hits a baseball." 
(10/21/14 Tr., p. 96, Ls. 7-20. 1) Mr. Ault heard more than one loud "crack." 
(10/21/14 Tr., p. 99, Ls. 7-19.) He also testified that Mr. Steel never hit Gonzalez 
and Mr. Steel never had a weapon. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 103, Ls. 18-24.) 
Officer Anderson testified that he asked Gonzalez four times if he was 
involved in the fight and Gonzalez repeatedly denied that he was involved. 
(10/21/14 Tr., p. 137, L. 5 - p. 141, L. 15; see also Ex. 30 at 0:36 - 1 :50.2) The 
state admitted a recording of Officer Anderson's interview with Gonzalez 
(10/21/14 Tr., p. 138, L. 14 - p. 140, L. 6; Ex. 30), during which the following 
exchange occurred: 
Officer Anderson: Tell me about the fight that happened down the 
road? 
Gonzalez: What fight? 
Officer Anderson: So you're not going to talk to me about the fight? 
Gonzalez: What fight? 
1 Mr. Ault testified he saw one man "punching" another. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 96, Ls. 
7-20.) He did not see anything other than one man's "arm in the air going down." 
~Id.) 
At trial, Gonzalez's request tor an attorney was redacted from the audio 
recording. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 330, Ls. 4-13; see Ex. 30.) 
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Officer Anderson: That happened over here at Corpus Christi. You 
and another guy in the alley. What happened? 
Gonzalez: Wasn't me, man. 
Officer Anderson: You've been followed since that location. 
You've been followed since there. They watched the whole thing, 
man. 
Gonzalez: \Nasn't me. [inaudible] 
Officer Anderson: Let me see your knuckles. Ok. Wasn't you? 
Alright. We're going to hold you here, then we're going to find that 
out. We're going to have somebody come over here and point you 
out. 
Gonzalez: [inaudible] 
Officer Anderson: If you can tell me what happened. Maybe he did 
something to you, I don't know. But you want to tell me the whole 
story or not? 
Gonzalez: Well you tell me what happened. 
Officer Anderson: Well, dude, I'm telling you, you got into a fight. 
Everybody watched it. They've been following you to here. 
Gonzalez: What fight? 
Officer Anderson: The fight you just got in with a guy and punched 
him. Tell me. 
Gonzalez: How could I punch a guy without being what .. I was just 
walking down the road. 
Other voice: [inaudible] with a stick. 
Officer Anderson: You hit him with a stick, man. Tell me about that 
then. 
Gonzalez: Well you tell me about it you guys don't know the story. 
Other voice: The stick is still over there on the scene. Ok. 
Gonzalez: Good. 
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(Ex. 30 at 0:36-1:50;3 see also 10/21/14 Tr., 137, L. 5-p. 141, L. 15.) 
Dr. James Mayberry, a trauma surgeon, testified that Mr. Steel had 
extensive facial fractures and a brain injury. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 175, L. 14- p. 176, 
L. 18.) Joseph Lunghofer, a firefighter, testified that he treated Mr. Steel at the 
scene and found a small personal folding knife, with the blade closed, clipped to 
Mr. Steel's pocket. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 248, L. 12- p. 249, L. 13.) 
Gonzalez testified in his own defense. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 283, L. 17 - p. 
329, L. 12.) The district court advised Gonzalez regarding his rights. (10/22/14 
Tr., p. 279, L. 1 - p. 282, L. 17.) On direct examination, Gonzalez admitted to 
hitting Mr. Steel with a stick, but Gonzalez claimed he acted in self-defense 
because Mr. Steel threatened him and came at him with a knife. (10/22/14 Tr., 
p. 293, Ls. 6-18, p. 294, L. 19 - p. 298, L. 21.) The state cross-examined 
Gonzalez about the inconsistencies between his trial testimony and what he told 
Officer Anderson. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 327, L. 22-13. 329, L. 12.) 
Q. Okay. So you go over to 25th and Idaho and the police 
contact you; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you heard the audio and the police asked you about the 
fight in the alleyway? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you said what fight? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they asked again about the fight in the alleyway and you 
say what fight? 
3 The audio recording was transcribed by appellate counsel for the respondent. 
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A. Yes. I asked for a lawyer. They didn't put that on there. 
Q. And you say when the officer asked you, did somebody 
come at you, man? Does somebody come at you, you don't say 
that they did? 
A. I said I wanted to talk to a lawyer. 
MR. CAHILL: Objection. 
MS. DUGGAN: Judge, may we take a break, please? 
(10/22/14 Tr., p. 328, L. 22 - p. 329, L. 15.) The district court held a conference 
outside the presence of the jury. Gonzalez moved for a mistrial. (10/22/14 Tr., 
p. 331, L. 24 - p. 332, L. 22.) Gonzalez claimed that the prosecutor's questions 
invited Gonzalez to comment on his pre-arrest silence. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 330, Ls. 
1-23.) The district court denied the motion because the prosecutor was asking 
questions regarding Gonzalez's answers to Officer Anderson. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 
332, L. 12 - p. 333, L. 14.) 
The state did not ask Gonzalez any more questions. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 
334, Ls. 1-2.) The jury found Gonzalez guilty of aggravated battery and found he 
used a deadly weapon in the commission of aggravated battery. (R., pp. 140-
141.) Gonzalez pied guilty to the persistent violator enhancement. (10/22/14 
Tr., p. 391, L. 21 - p. 396, L. 2; R., p. 105.) 
At sentencing, Gonzalez represented that he had read the updated PSI 
materials and said there were no deficiencies or errors in those reports. 
(12/10/14 Tr., p. 403, Ls. 1-21.) Gonzalez had no objection to anything included 
in the reports. (Id.) However, the district court noted that a 2006 competency 
evaluation was attached to a prior presentence report which was included in the 
6 
PSI materials. (12/10/14 Tr., 416, 20 - p. 418, 17; PSI, pp. 310-349.) 
The district court did not read the competency evaluation or consider it for 
sentencing. (12/10/14 Tr., p. 416, L. 20 - p. 418, 17.) The district court 
indicated that it would like to remove the competency report, but was not sure it 
had the authority to alter a previous PSI. (Id.) Gonzalez deferred to the district 
court regarding whether it had the authority to remove the 2006 competency 
evaluation. (Id.) Gonzalez did not object, nor did Gonzalez at any time file a 
motion to remove the 2006 competency evaluation. (Id; see generally R.) 
The district court sentenced Gonzalez to life with 20 years fixed. (R., pp. 
156-160, 162-166.) Gonzalez timely appealed. (R., pp. 167-169.) 
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ISSUES 
Gonzalez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Gonzalez's 
motion for a mistrial. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by not 
ordering a competency evaluation to be removed from the PSI 
materials. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Gonzalez failed to show the district court erred when it denied 
his motion for a mistrial? 
2. Has Gonzalez failed to show the district court committed 
fundamental error when it did not remove a 2006 competency evaluation 




Gonzalez Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When it Denied His 
Motion For A Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
Gonzalez told Officer Anderson that he was not involved in a fight and 
repeatedly denied knowing anything about a fight. (Ex. 30 at 0:36 - 1 :50; see 
also 10/21/14 Tr., p. 137, L. 5 - p. 141, L. 15.) However, at trial Gonzalez 
testified that he was involved in a fight with Mr. Steel, but acted in self-defense. 
(10/22/14 Tr., p. 293, Ls. 6-18, p. 294, L. 19 - p. 298, L. 21.) In response to the 
prosecutor cross-examining Gonzalez regarding these inconsistent statements 
Gonzalez referenced his request for counsel. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 328, L. 22 - p. 
329, L. 15.) Gonzalez moved for a mistrial. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 331, L. 24 - p. 332, 
L. 22.) The district court denied the motion for a mistrial because the prosecutor 
was asking questions regarding Gonzalez's answers to Officer Anderson. 
(10/22/14 Tr., p. 332, L. 12 - p. 333, L. 14.) 
On appeal, Gonzalez argues the district court erred because the 
prosecutor's questions constituted an impermissible comment on Gonzalez's 
right to remain silent. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-12.) The district court did not err. 
The prosecutor was questioning Gonzalez about his statements to Officer 
Anderson and was not commenting on Gonzalez's right to remain silent. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard for reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial 
is well established. State v. Passons, 158 Idaho 286, 292-93, 346 P.3d 303, 
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309-10 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 
1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether 
the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented 
reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, 
where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the 
"abuse of discretion" standard is a misnomer. The standard, more 
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is upon the 
continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the 
mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be 
disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error. 
l!i (citing Urquhart, 105 Idaho at 95, 665 P.2d at 1105). "An error is harmless, 
not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing court is able to declare beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict." State v. 
Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 300, 297 P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010)). 
C. Gonzalez Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied 
His Motion For A Mistrial 
Motions for mistrial are governed by I.C.R. 29.1. Urquhart, 105 Idaho at 
95, 665 P.2d at 1105. "A mistrial may be declared upon motion of the 
defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the 
proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to 
the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). 
Gonzalez's motion for a mistrial claimed that the prosecutor was inviting 
Gonzalez to comment on his pre-arrest silence. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 330, Ls. 14-23, 
10 
331, 24 - p. 332, L. 22.) When a defendant elects to testify, state does 
not violate the defendant's due process rights or Fifth Amendment rights by 
inquiring into inconsistencies between the defendant's trial testimony and his 
pretrial statements. See Urquhart, 105 Idaho at 94, 665 P.2d at 1104 (citing 
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-408 (1980)). That is what happened 
here. 
The prosecutor cross-examined Gonzalez about his prior inconsistent 
statements. Immediately after the fight, Gonzalez repeatedly denied to Officer 
Anderson that he was involved in the fight near the Corpus Christi house: 
Officer Anderson: Tell me about the fight that happened down the 
road? 
Gonzalez: What fight? 
Officer Anderson: So you're not going to talk to me about the fight? 
Gonzalez: What fight? 
Officer Anderson: That happened over here at Corpus Christi. You 
and another guy in the alley. What happened? 
Gonzalez: Wasn't me, man. 
Officer Anderson: You've been followed since that location. 
You've been followed since there. They watched the whole thing, 
man. 
Gonzalez: Wasn't me. [inaudible] 
Officer Anderson: Let me see your knuckles. Ok. Wasn't you? 
Alright. We're going to hold you here, then we're going to find that 




Officer Anderson: If you can tell me what happened. Maybe he did 
something to you, I don't know. But you want to tell me the whole 
story or not? 
Gonzalez: Well you tell me what happened. 
Officer Anderson: Well, dude, I'm telling you, you got into a fight. 
Everybody watched it. They've been following you to here. 
Gonzaiez: What fight? 
Officer Anderson: The fight you just got in with a guy and punched 
him. Tell me. 
Gonzalez: How could I punch a guy without being what .. I was just 
walking down the road. 
Other voice: [inaudible] with a stick. 
Officer Anderson: You hit him with a stick, man. Tell me about that 
then. 
Gonzalez: Well you tell me about it you guys don't know the story. 
Other voice: The stick is still over there on the scene. Ok. 
Gonzalez: Good. 
(Ex. 30 at 0:36 - 1:50; see also 10/21/14 Tr., p. 137, L. 5 - p. 141, L. 15.) On 
direct examination Gonzalez gave a different story. Gonzalez admitted to hitting 
Mr. Steel with a stick, but claimed that Mr. Steel threatened him and came at him 
with a knife. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 293, Ls. 6-18, p. 294, L. 19 - p. 298, L. 21.) On 
cross-examination, the state asked Gonzalez about his statements to Officer 
Anderson where he repeatedly denied knowing anything about a fight: 
Q. Okay. So you go over to 25th and Idaho and the police 
contact you; right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you heard the audio and the police asked you about the 
fight in the alleyway? 
A Yes. 
Q. And you said what fight? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they asked again about the fight in the alleyway and you 
say what fight? 
A. Yes. I asked for a lawyer. They didn't put that on there. 
Q. And you say when the officer asked you, did somebody 
come at you, man? Does somebody come at you, you don't say 
that they did? 
A. I said I wanted to talk to a lawyer. 
(10/22/14 Tr., p. 328, L. 22 - p. 329, L. 12.) The prosecutor's line of questioning 
references the same questions that Officer Anderson asked Gonzalez right after 
the fight. Gonzalez repeatedly denied any involvement with a fight to Officer 
Anderson. The prosecutor was walking Gonzalez through his multiple denials. It 
was proper for the prosecutor to cross-examine Gonzalez about the 
inconsistencies between his trial testimony and his voluntary pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda statements. There was no error. 
Gonzalez's argument on appeal is based upon the inaccurate claim that 
the prosecutor was attempting to infer guilt from Gonzalez's "silence." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Gonzalez argues: 
[The prosecutor] also admitted that her purpose in treading 
those waters was to infer Mr. Gonzalez's guilt from his decision to 
not talk with the officers: "He's conversing with the officers. He is 
in a position to tell them, if he wants to, that there was self-defense. 
He's now making up self-defense that didn't exist before after 
having the opportunity to look at the report and see that the 
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paramedics take a folding knife out of [Mr. Steel's] pocket." (Tr., p. 
331, Ls. 1-7.) That is precisely the type of improper substantive 
inference of guilt from the defendant's silence that the Fifth 
Amendment protects against. See e.g. Moore, 131 Idaho at 820. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) As cited above, the prosecutor was not attempting to 
infer guilt from Gonzalez's "silence." Gonzalez repeatedly made statements 
denying any involvement with the fight. (Ex. 30 at 0:36 - 1 :50; see aiso 10/21 /14 
Tr., p. 137, L. 5 - p. 141, L. 15.) Gonzalez testified inconsistently with these 
prior statements, because he testified that he was involved in the fight, but it was 
only in self-defense. (10/22/14 Tr., p. 293, Ls. 6-18, p. 294, L. 19 - p. 298, L. 
21.) The prosecutor was not cross-examining Gonzalez about his "silence," but 
was cross-examining him regarding his inconsistent statements about whether 
he was involved in the fight. 
Gonzalez also argues that the only answer that he could have given to the 
prosecutor's questions was to reference his request for a lawyer. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 11-12.) Gonzalez argues: 
And yet, despite knowing of that extremely high risk, the prosecutor 
decided to proceed with that line of questioning anyway. In fact, 
her next question practically required Mr. Gonzalez to give the 
answer which would violate his rights: "And you say when the 
officer asked you, did somebody come at you man? Does 
somebody come at you, you don't say that they did?" (Tr., p. 
329, Ls. 9-11 (emphasis added).) There is only answer [sic] Mr. 
Gonzalez could give that would relate any semblance of the full 
truth to the jury - / did not say that because I had requested to talk 
to a lawyer. And unsurprisingly, that is the answer he gave: "I said 
I wanted to talk to a lawyer." (Tr., p. 329, L. 12.) 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12 (emphasis in original).) The premise of this 
argument ignores the responses that Gonzalez actually gave to Officer 
Anderson. When Officer Anderson asked Gonzalez a very similar question-
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Gonzalez denied knowing anything about the fight. (See 30 0:36 - 1 ·50.) 
Gonzalez was not constrained to answer the prosecutor's question by 
referencing his request for counsel. The prosecutor's question only invited 
Gonzalez to admit the truth; that he denied any involvement in the fight when he 
was questioned by Officer Anderson. The district court did not err by denying 
Gonzalez's motion for a mistrial. 
Even if it was error, Gonzalez's references to his request for counsel was 
harmless. "An error is harmless, not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing court 
is able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to 
the verdict." Frauenberger, 154 Idaho at 300, 297 P. 3d at 263 (citing Chapman, 
386 U.S. 18, 24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979). Gonzalez's 
references to his request for counsel did not contribute to the verdict. Ms. Hone 
testified that she saw Gonzalez grab a stick and hit Mr. Steel who was riding a 
bicycle. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 27, L. 17 - p. 28, L. 19.) Gonzalez hit Mr. Steel so 
hard it sounded like a gunshot. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 1-5.) Ms. Hone saw 
Gonzalez hit Mr. Steel three times. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 6-16.) Ms. Hone did 
not see Mr. Steel do anything or say anything to Gonzalez before Gonzalez hit 
Mr. Steel. (10/21/14 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 3-13, p. 39, Ls. 1-12.) Mr. Ault testified that 
Mr. Steel never hit Gonzalez and Mr. Steel never had a weapon. (10/21/14 Tr., 
p. 103, Ls. 18-24.) Further, Gonzalez's self-defense claim at trial was 
inconsistent with his statements to Officer Anderson immediately after the attack. 
(Ex. 30 at 0:36 - 1:50; see also 10/21/14 Tr., p. 137, L. 5 - p. 141, L. 15.) This 
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court can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gonzalez's references to his 
request for counsel did not contribute to the guilty verdict. 
11. 
Gonzalez Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Fundamental Error 
When It Did Not Remove A Competency Evaluation From The PSI 
A. introduction 
Gonzalez did not object when the district court indicated it would leave, 
but not consider, the 2006 competency evaluation in the PSI materials. Nor did 
Gonzalez file a motion to remove the 2006 competency evaluation. On appeal, 
Gonzalez failed to argue, let alone establish, the district court committed 
fundamental error. 
B. Gonzalez Did Not Object To The District Court Leaving The 2006 
Competency Evaluation In The PSI Materials And He Has Failed To 
Establish Fundamental Error On Appeal 
In 2006 a jury found Gonzalez guilty of felony driving under the influence 
in case number CR-2004-1948. (PSI, pp. 310-325.) As part of that case, Dr. 
Engle performed an Idaho Code § 18-211 competency evaluation of Gonzalez. 
(PSI, pp. 326-330.) The PSI materials from CR-2004-1948, including the 2006 
competency evaluation, were included as part of the historical PSI materials of 
this case. (See PSI, pp. 310-349.) 
At sentencing, Gonzalez represented that he had read the updated PSI 
materials and said there were no deficiencies or errors in those reports. 
(12/10/14 Tr., p. 403, Ls. 1-21.) Gonzalez had no objection to anything included 
in the reports. (Id.) The district court noted that the 2006 competency evaluation 
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was attached to the CR-2004-1948 presentence report. (12/10/14 Tr., p. 416, L. 
20 - p. 418, L. 17.) The district court did not consider the 2006 competency 
evaluation and indicated that it would like to remove the competency report, but 
did not think it had the authority to alter a previous PSI. (Id.) Gonzalez's trial 
counsel, Mr. Cahill, deferred to the district court's judgment regarding whether it 
had the authority to remove the 2006 competency evaluation. (Id.) 
[THE COURT]: But I would like to enter an order telling the 
presentence department they are to remove that from the 
presentence materials. Is there anyone here who objects to that? 
[Prosecutor]: No objection, Judge. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cahill? 
MR. CAHILL: Judge, I don't know what effect my comment has. 
Apparently he was representing himself in front of Judge Wetherell. 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. CAHILL: So I'm assuming it was in Judge Wetherell's PSI, not 
in-
THE COURT: It was. 
MR. CAHILL: It's in yours, but -
THE COURT: It is in mine because his is attached and technically 
I'm not allowed to do anything. 
MR. CAHILL: I will defer to your judgment, judge. 
THE COURT: I have not reviewed it, but I'm concerned about it. 
So I just want to make the record that if you - because I think 
technically I cannot change a prior presentence report. It should 
have been changed at the time. But I have paper clipped it. I 
haven't read it and certainly have not considered it because that 
would - my opinion would be inappropriate since any statements 
he made, he would not have been treated to the same 
constitutional protections that he has in the other presentence 
materials. So like I said, I have not reviewed those materials. 
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(12/10/14 Tr., p. 417, L. 12 - p. 418, L. 17.) 
For the first time on appeal, Gonzalez argues that the district court abused 
its discretion by not removing the 2006 competency evaluation from the PSI 
materials. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-16.) "Generally Idaho's appellate courts will 
not consider error not preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." Perry, 
150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976 (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 
894 P.2d 125, 129 (1995)). An exception to this principle exists if the alleged 
error constitutes fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. 
The burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the 
defendant asserting the error for the first time on appeal. ~ at 228, 245 P.3d at 
980. To carry that burden, a defendant claiming error for the first time on appeal 
must demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information 
as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." ~ at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
Gonzalez did not object or make a motion to remove the 2006 
competency evaluation from the PSI materials. (See 12/10/14 Tr., p. 417, L. 12 
- p. 418, L. 17.) Nor has he argued on appeal that the district court's failure to 
remove the 2006 competency evaluation constituted fundamental error under the 
standards articulated in Perry. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 12-16.) Because 
Gonzalez has not even asserted fundamental error, much less attempted to 
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carry his burden of demonstrating it on appeal, this 
consider the merits of this claim. 
must decline to 
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Gonzalez's claim, Gonzalez has 
failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it decided not to 
remove the 2006 competency evaluation from the PSI materials in this case. 
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 12-16.) A court does not abuse its discretion if the 
court (1) recognizes the decision as one of discretion, (2) acts within the bounds 
of that discretion and applies appropriate legal standards, and (3) reaches the 
decision through an exercise of reason. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 
965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). Here the district court was initially unclear whether it 
had the authority to remove a competency evaluation that was part of a prior PSI 
prepared for sentencing in a different case. (12/10/14 Tr., p. 417, L. 12 - p. 418, 
L. 17.) After the district court did not receive any objection or guidance from 
Gonzalez, the district court decided to leave the 2006 competency evaluation in 
the materials, but not read them. (See id.) It was reasonable for the district 
court to do so, because the 2006 competency evaluation was attached to a PSI 
for a prior unrelated case, CR-2004-1948. (See PSI, pp. 310-349.) Therefore, 
even if the 2006 competency evaluation was removed from this case, it would 
still be included in CR-2004-1948 and potentially any other felony which used the 
PSI for CR-2004-1948. On appeal, Gonzalez recognizes this problem, but 
argues that if the 2006 competency evaluation were removed from this case it 
could "help highlight the issue, should some future court or Department of 
Correction board be presented with both the prior PSI and the current PSI in the 
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future." (Appellant's brief, p. 16.) Gonzalez does not address how some future 
court or Department of Correction board would even be aware that the 2006 
competency evaluation was removed from this case. Nor does Gonzalez explain 
how even the awareness of the removal would cause some future court or board 
to sua sponte disregard the 2006 competency evaluation. 
Gonzalez has failed to meet his burden of showing that the district court's 
decision to not remove the 2006 competency evaluation constituted fundamental 
error, and has otherwise failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
not removing the 2006 competency evaluation from the PSI materials in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2015. 
~-N-----
Deputy Attorney General 
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